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WHY’D THEY DO THAT?
ANALYZING PILOT MINDSET IN ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS
Ed Wischmeyer, Ph.D., ATP/CFII
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Prescott, AZ
In teaching a series of classes that analyzed “classical” airline accidents, it was observed that human behavior in
such accidents was often understood better when the “mindset” of the protagonists was studied explicitly, rather than
implicitly, and that the time element was also useful in such analyses. Often pilots took actions not explainable by
traditional error models, and not predictable from known influences. These observations started a series of iterations
that eventually converged on the PEEMBO model (Predispositions, Environment, Events, Mindset and mental
condition, Behaviors, and missed Opportunities.)  The PEEMBO model now appears mature enough for routine use
in accident and other analyses, and presents insights not obvious in SHEL, Reason’s, and derivative models.
Summary
In teaching an introductory graduate level class which
addressed “classical” airline accidents, it became
apparent that a direct, rather than indirect, focus on
flight crew “mindset” provided an extremely useful
analysis perspective complementary to existing
analysis models. This observation co-evolved with the
PEEMBO (pronounced pim-bo) model, whose
elements are Predispositions, Environment, Events,
Mindset, Behavior, and missed Opportunities. Initial
analyses of both NTSB accident reports and ASRS
anecdotal reports indicate high value to this approach
and model.
The central hypothesis of this note is that there is a
significant class of airline accidents where pilot
mindset is the central, identifiable, and addressable
contributor to the accident. An example of mindset is
this classic quote:
"When anyone asks how I can best describe my
experience in nearly 40 years at sea, I merely say,
uneventful. Of course there have been winter
gales, and storms and fog and the like, but in all
my experience, I have never been in any accident
of any sort worth speaking about. I never saw a
wreck and never have been wrecked, nor was I
ever in any predicament that threatened to end in
disaster of any sort". Edward J. Smith, Captain,
RMS Titanic.
The PEEMBO model was evolved to support analysis
of accidents that have a large human error component,
such as airline accidents. Key attributes of such
accidents include:
• The accident is caused by the conjunction of
multiple factors.
• The accident sequence usually progresses over a
non-instantaneous time frame, with strong
correlation over time between many observed
phenomena.
• One or, more usually, many of the observed
phenomena are best described by human factors.
• Actions and decisions of the flight crew are driven
by the mindset (motivations and beliefs) of the
crew,  and  although  that  mindset  is  in  general
influenced by predispositions, in incidents and
accidents, there is often a stochastic element.
• The failure to employ available “defenses”1 often
appears to reflect mindset. If the flight crew
believes their goal is achievable, there is no reason
to abandon that goal by employing a defense.
The advantages of the PEEMBO model include:
• Focus on influences on the protagonist (e.g., the
flight crew), not on a “probable cause.”
• Focus on the mindset of the protagonist. This
mindset may not be considered an actual “cause,”
but the protagonist’s mindset may reveal.
motivations for a variety of decisions made, actions
taken, and defenses bypassed.
• Recognition of the time element in such accidents,
where the relationship between significant
phenomena may be described by vehicle dynamics
or logical consequences.2
• Recognition of individual events as significant in
the progression of the accident. Events have a
specific time or a short time range associated with
them, as opposed to environment.
• Differentiation between those factors under the
control of the protagonist and those not.
• Identifies a remediable, hazardous attitude.
This paper discusses PEEMBO and attempts to place it
within the context of other human error models.
1 Reason, James.




Determination of “probable cause” has been a goal of
accident investigation at least since the founding of the
National Transportation Safety Board. Presumably, the
focus on probable cause is to identify specific factors
and thus to permit the initiation of remedial action.
Thus, other analyses that similarly permit the initiation
of remedial action will ultimately achieve the same
goal, even without the focus on “probable cause.”
Traditional accident analysis classes frequently use the
SHEL(L) model and Reason’s model as ways of
identifying such remediable factors. However, the
combination of these two was often observed to be
weak in describing the time sequence of events in an
accident chain; the immediate mindset of the
protagonist; the occurrence of significant chance
events; and the degree of contribution of various
elements. Leveson’s STAMP model provides another
excellent means of analysis, but is weak in
accommodating variations in human motivation.
Similarly, the information-decision-action model of
Nagel ignores “the possibility of… inappropriate high
level goals.” 3 The PEEMBO model would express
some its analogous concepts as inputs-mindset-
behaviors, hypothesizing that the information
processing included in the first stage of Nagel’s model
is very heavily influenced by the mindset of the crew.
Indeed, Nagel quotes Monan (1986): “Pilots heard
what they expected to hear, heard what they wanted to
hear and frequently did not hear what they did not
anticipate hearing – amendments to just-issued
clearances.” To rephrase this, “pilots remolded what
they  heard  to  be  consistent  with  their  mindset,”  or  to
expand this further, “pilots remold their perceptions,
decisions, and actions to be consistent with their
mindset.”
Similar to the PEEMBO model, but not part of its
evolutionary chain, is the 5-M model by T.P. Wright of
Cornell University: originally man-machine-medium,
mission and then management were added.
The basic PEEMBO model is shown in Figure 1,  with
only  the major relationships between blocks shown.
Elements of the PEEMBO Model
Predispositions are those pre-existing, repeatable
factors that shape the way that the protagonist thinks
about and reacts to the operating environment and
events. Predispositions share the characteristic that they
3 Wiener and Nagel, Chapter 9
will be repeatedly observable in the protagonist over a
period of months and years, across multiple situations
and events.
Safety training, such as windshear avoidance training,
CRM training, and runway incursion awareness
training, are well known examples of attempts to
reshape a pilot’s predispositions to:
• Suspect the presence of dangerous conditions,
• Detect and mitigate dangers,
• Employ defenses and not miss opportunities.
Predispositions include self-image, the way the
protagonist wishes to be perceived by others,4 training,
experience, policy, procedures, skills, confidence,
values, beliefs, personality style, techniques in
executing procedures (whether formally sanctioned and
taught or learned ad hoc), and interpersonal
communication style.
Training and self-improvement are common techniques
used to improve an individual’s predispositions.
However, in the course of a single event, an individual
will have no control over his predispositions.
The FAA teaches the “five hazardous attitudes,”5 and
these are predispositions. However, these attitudes are
often inadequate to explain pilot mindset.
Environment refers to the operating environment for
this particular event, particularly as it affects the style
of human operation and the probability of various
events. Examples of environment include visibility,
weather, runways in use, thunderstorm, traffic level,
competence of various individuals, capabilities of the
aircraft, capabilities of other hardware, schedule
pressure, equipment installed on the ground or in the
air, equipment not operational on the ground or in the
air, and many other factors.
The protagonist will have little control over the
environment. Usually, the one choice available is to
leave the environment. For example, an airline crew
may  choose  not  to  land  at  some  airport,  leave  the
environment of that airport, and go elsewhere. Less
commonly, a protagonist may attempt to reshape the
environment by requesting that additional equipment
be activated, or by requesting that another individual
improve their performance (e.g., to “shape up!”)
4 Associate Dean Mike Polay, Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University, Prescott, AZ, personal
conversation
5 FAA Advisory Circular 60-22
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The environment can influence mindset. Recognition
of a hazardous environment can induce a cautious
mindset, or schedule pressures can induce a risk-
tolerant mindset. Similarly, a high workload
environment can induce a mindset of excessive focus
on  the  task  at  hand,  with  errors  being  a  result.
Similarly, such a high workload environment can
increase the odds that opportunities are missed.
Events are occurrences external to the protagonist,
beyond his control, that occur during the time frame of
the event. Events can be considered in two ways:
• Events would commonly be thought to include
lightning strikes, wind shear, mechanical failures,
radio transmissions, an aircraft on the runway, and
other chance events that occur within the
environment being considered.
• Events are also changes in the environment. For
example, a change in which runway is active is
appropriately considered an event.
The likelihood of events is predictable from the
environment, but not the occurrence of a specific event
at a specific time. For example, the presence of a
severe thunderstorm will predict lightning, rain, gusty
winds, and wind shear, but will not determine when
each lightning stroke will occur. Similarly, an
environment of high radio traffic will increase the
likelihood of a transmission being blocked.
Note  that  only  the  likelihood  of  events  can  be
predicted, not a particular occurrence. For example,
gusty winds can be predicted, but not the specifics of
any one gust. Thus, events provide a way for “chance
events” to be incorporated into the error model.
Protagonists can only react to events, not control them.
A point implied by the PEEMBO model is that the
protagonist will be susceptible to these chance events.
The protagonist will be prepared for these chance
events by training, equipment, experience, and perhaps
warning systems, but those preparations frequently will
be designed to reduce susceptibility to chance events,
not to handle nor to avoid all chance events.
"External" implies that the PEEMBO model is
contextual, and considers the context of the
protagonist(s) as “the” context.
Mindset / Mental Condition In many accidents, the
mindset of the protagonist is the central factor in the
accident, and the decisions and actions taken, and the
opportunities missed, are manifestations of this mindset.
Thus, Mindset is central to the PEEMBO model.
Mindset includes the attitudes, motivations, expectations,
knowledge, feelings, plans, goals, and self-image of the
protagonist in this one situation. Examples of mindset are,
“I can do this,” “I have to do this,” or “I’d better not do
anything until I figure this all out.”
An alternative expansion of the “M” in PEEMBO is
“mental condition.” The protagonist’s mental condition
can  be  strongly  influenced  by  factors  such  as  the
perceived or anticipated degree of difficulty of the
flight; complacency or apprehension; anticipated
competency of others; impatience; expected
environment; physiological stresses of all sorts;
psychological stresses of all sorts; and knowledge of
conditions, including observations of other flights &
environment. Similarly, skills and competence are
components of mental condition.
“Mental condition” seems a more complete, more
clear, and more useful analysis tool than “mindset.”
However, many accident scenarios indicate that pilot
mindset, unfortunately adopted and never challenged,
is a major factor in many accidents.
Although predispositions are presumed to be relatively
consistent  over  a  period  of  weeks  or  months,  the
mindset of the protagonist is considered only within the
context of each accident occurrence. Thus, mindset will
not necessarily be consistent across situations.
Just as the protagonist will have no control over
predispositions and events, and at most limited control
over the environment, the protagonist may have little if
any control over his mindset.
Explicit examples of mindset are not hard to find. In
the Cali accident, at time 2136:38, the First Officer
expressed mindset by saying, “We can do it.”
Similarly,  in  the  Burbank  accident,  there  is  a  strong
implied mindset, “we can do this.” Although this is
speculative, one wonders at what point “we can do
this” transforms into the dangerous mindset, “we have
to do this.”
In  a  set  of  10  NASA  ASRS  reports  on  unstable
approaches,6 mindset statements included:
1. “We’ll be all right.” (ASRS 458452)
2. “Enough is enough.” (ASRS 450568)
3. “I do not like the looks of this” and “Let’s see how
it is at 1000 feet” (ASRS 144766)
4. “[I said] we could make it.” Later, the captain did in
fact go around, indicating a more safety conscious
mindset of, “we can make it, if…” (ASRS 253786)
6 Selected by graduate student Mukul Mishra for a
class on flight safety
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5. “[he said] he could still do it.” (ASRS 302878)
6. “Try to save an approach visually.” (ASRS 521341)
7. “He tended to want to ‘fly solo.’” (ASRS 305526)
8.
Although no detailed study of mindset in ASRS
approaches has been conducted, it is impressive to see
such clear statements of mindset in such a high
proportion of reports.
Leveson states “explanations for human goals and
motives will depend on assumptions that cannot be
directly [emphasis hers] measured or observed by the
accident investigator.”  ASRS reports indicate that
mindset information is available, if not in accidents per
se, at least in anecdotal voluntary submissions.
Personal conversations with pilots from an airline with
a strong FOQA program conveyed another mindset.
One  pilot  told  me  that  when  an  approach  may  be
exceeding allowable limits, he asks himself if
completing the approach will be worth having to make
explanations to the FOQA monitoring committee on
why he did what he did.
One valuable source of mindset is the phrasing and
tone of speech. Such phrasing and tone is not available
in printed CVR transcripts, and the unavailability of
such information is not consistent with national safety
goals. There seem to be multiple ways of providing
such valuable phrasing and tone information while
meeting traditional privacy goals.
Behavior refers to both the decisions and actions of the
protagonist.
During the progression of a scenario, the protagonist
may make a number of decisions. These decisions may
result in deliberate actions at either an abstract level
(e.g., starting an approach) or at a lower level (e.g.,
calling for the landing gear to be lowered.)  A decision,
once made, will limit possible future decisions and
actions. Once an action is taken, it, too, will limit
future actions and decisions. For these reasons, actions
and decisions are grouped into “Behaviors.”
A  property  of  “behaviors”  in  the  PEEMBO  sense  is
that a time, or a start time before a relatively short time
interval, is associated with each behavior.
Not all actions will be the result of conscious decision,
however. For example, a skilled pilot may perform
tracking tasks without conscious deliberation of each
correction.
Reason’s error model of slip, lapse, violation, and
mistake is split in the PEEMBO model: slip, violation,
and mistake are considered behaviors, and a lapse is
considered a missed opportunity, described below.
Missed opportunities are actions that the protagonist
could have been taken to reduce risk or severity but did
not. Missed opportunities also include decisions that
were  not  made,  said  decisions  establishing  the
framework for the actions not taken. Missed
opportunities in the context of incidents and accidents
may be defenses not employed in Reason’s model.
Examples of missed opportunities include going
around; proceeding to the alternate; being more clear in
communications; and asking for clarification of
communications from others.
It seems clear that a flight crew will not employ
defenses when they believe that the flight can be safely
concluded. An interesting hypothesis is that the crew’s
mindset causes them to ignore cues and misinterpret
events, as hinted at by Monan (1986), above.
Missed opportunities are most interesting when they
could have prevented the accident, but missed
opportunities may be mitigating as well. Missed
opportunities may or may not be associated with a
specific point in time, and may or may not be
repeatable. Useful classifications of missed
opportunities include:
• Preventing – taking this course of action or making
this decision would have prevented the accident
• Supporting – although this course of action not
taken would not have prevented the accident, it
supports observations about the mindset of the
flight crew.
Causality
In our society, we tend to look for direct causes of
accidents. Certainly this phenomenon is observable in
the press, and sometimes in politicians, legal
proceedings, and the military. Indeed, the idea that
retribution will re-establish the world order is traceable
at least as far back as Shakespearean times.
Particularly in aviation accidents, such direct causality
is rare. More common, and more difficult to analyze
are events in which improper motivation(s) were the
“direct cause.” For such psychological phenomena, it
seems more appropriate to use terms that reflect such
motivations than to use terms of formal logic.
In the PEEMBO model, the following non-exclusive
terms are used to describe the causality of a
phenomenon contributing to an accident:
• Necessary – if this one phenomenon were not
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present, the accident would not have occurred, even
if all other phenomena were still present.
• Sufficient – this phenomenon would cause the
accident  all  by  itself,  even if  all  other  factors  were
absent. Sufficient phenomena are rare in aviation,
with the most common occurrences being
irrecoverable mechanical problems.
• Continuing – this phenomenon is a direct
consequence of a previous behavior (action or
decision). Because it is a consequence, it adds little
if anything to the discussion of “causality.” For
example, high airspeed on final approach following
a late descent is not considered an independent
phenomenon, but is considered to be a continuation
of the late descent.
• Irrelevant – this phenomenon has nothing to do with
the causality of the accident. It is worth noting that
phenomena may be irrelevant because they had
nothing to do with the accident, or because the
model has no way to handle that phenomenon. Most
accident analysis models will not be able to
properly accommodate all phenomena of an
accident, so within the context of each accident
analysis model, some factors will be irrelevant.
• Motivating – explains why the crew made the
choices they did. Such motivations would include
corporate culture, schedule pressure, and how each
crew member wanted to be perceived by others.
• Contributing – while this phenomenon was neither
necessary nor sufficient, it contributed to the
evolution of the scenario being studied, particularly
to the severity of the scenario or to the difficulty in
returning to a more normal state of operation.
Speculation is that many contributing factors may
be motivating factors.
• Supporting – gives useful insight into the
environment or the crew’s mindset, although it had
nothing to do with the accident causality in a strict
sense. Thus, a supporting factor cannot be
necessary.  For  example,  in  the  case  of  a  runway
overrun accident, an ignored GPWS warning on
short final might provide insights on the mindset
and mental condition of the crew but, strictly
speaking, would be irrelevant to a taxi error made
once off the runway. (This is similar to the
epidemiological concept of  “confounding.”)
Temporal Analysis
The  PEEMBO  model  not  only  groups  factors  by
control and influence, but by time.  There are three
time spans shared between the six boxes:
• Observed consistently before and during the
scenario – Predispositions only;
• Observed during the course of the scenario, but may
change at specific times – Mindset / mental
condition, and Environment;
• Observed at specific points in time during the
course of the scenario – Events, Behaviors, and
Missed Opportunities.
These time spans help clarify in which boxes specific
observed phenomena should be grouped.
Immediate Safety Lessons
The most common mindset observed using the Peembo
model, but certainly not the only mindset observed, is
“we can do it.”  Some accident reports indicate that this
mindset is present in pilots whose personality does not
fit the FAA “hazardous attitude” of “macho.”
This suggests, then, that a simple safety improvement
is that “we can do this” should never be accepted, but
should always be conditioned. Examples are “we can
do this  if,”   “we can  do  this  while,”   “we can  do  this
until,” and  “we can do this unless…”
Conclusions
A  direct  focus  on  pilot  mindset,  as  embodied  in  the
PEEMBO model,  has  been shown in  the  classroom to
be a valuable tool for analyzing airline accidents and
events. A preliminary review of ASRS events suggests
that mindset is an identifiable, addressable, and
significant contributor to unstable approach events.
Greater application of this model to a broader base of
scenarios will lead to improvements in this model and
even better models in years to come.
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